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Home → AKMA_AAnF

4.2.2.1 AKMA key storage and update

 Home → AKMA_AAnF → 19.0.0
33537-i00   → 33537-i01   → 33537-i10   → 33537-i20   →  33537-j00
Test Name TC_AKMA_Key_Storage_Update
Threat Reference

TR 33.926 [3], Annex W.2.2.3, AKMA key storage and update
Requirement Name

AKMA key storage update
Requirement Reference

TS 33.535 [4], clause 6.1
Requirement Description

The AAnF stores the latest information sent by the AUSF. After receiving the new generated A-KID and K~AKMA~, the AAnF deletes the old A-KID and K~AKMA~ and stores the new generated A-KID and K~AKMA~ as specified in TS 33.535 [4], clause 6.1.
Test Purpose

Verify that the AAnF stores only the latest AKMA context received by the AUSF.
Pre-Conditions

  • Test environment with AUSF and AF. The AUSF and the AF may be simulated.

  • AAnF network product is connected in emulated/real network environment.
Execution Steps

Test A:

  1. Primary authentication is simulated for a specific UE, leading to the simulated AUSF pushing SUPI, A-KID1, K~AKMA~1 to the AAnF.

  2. The AF requests a K~AF~ from the AAnF by proving A-KID1 and AF_ID.

  3. Another primary authentication is simulated for the same UE, leading to the simulated AUSF pushing SUPI, A-KID2, K~AKMA~2 to the AAnF.

  4. The AF requests a K~AF~ by providing A-KID1 to the AAnF.

  5. The AF requests a K~AF~ by providing A-KID2 to the AAnF.
Expected Results

The AF received an error message indicating the AKMA context related to A-KID 1 is not found after step 4). After step 5), the AF received a K~AF~ which is different from the K~AF~ that received after step 2).
Expected Format of Evidence

Evidence suitable for the interfaces for each step, between AAnF and AUSF, AAnF and AF/NEF, e.g., evidence can be presented in the form of screenshot/screen-capture or pcap traces.
PDFs 629f820298eb6aff6e59596ee5de423a

4.2.2.1 AKMA key storage and update

 Home → AKMA_AAnF → 18.2.0
33537-i00   → 33537-i01   → 33537-i10   →  33537-i20 → 33537-j00  
Test Name TC_AKMA_Key_Storage_Update
Threat Reference

TR 33.926 [3], Annex W.2.2.3, AKMA key storage and update
Requirement Name

AKMA key storage update
Requirement Reference

TS 33.535 [4], clause 6.1
Requirement Description

The AAnF stores the latest information sent by the AUSF. After receiving the new generated A-KID and K~AKMA~, the AAnF deletes the old A-KID and K~AKMA~ and stores the new generated A-KID and K~AKMA~ as specified in TS 33.535 [4], clause 6.1.
Test Purpose

Verify that the AAnF stores only the latest AKMA context received by the AUSF.
Pre-Conditions

  • Test environment with AUSF and AF. The AUSF and the AF may be simulated.

  • AAnF network product is connected in emulated/real network environment.
Execution Steps

Test A:

  1. Primary authentication is simulated for a specific UE, leading to the simulated AUSF pushing SUPI, A-KID1, K~AKMA~1 to the AAnF.

  2. The AF requests a K~AF~ from the AAnF by proving A-KID1 and AF_ID.

  3. Another primary authentication is simulated for the same UE, leading to the simulated AUSF pushing SUPI, A-KID2, K~AKMA~2 to the AAnF.

  4. The AF requests a K~AF~ by providing A-KID1 to the AAnF.

  5. The AF requests a K~AF~ by providing A-KID2 to the AAnF.
Expected Results

The AF received an error message indicating the AKMA context related to A-KID 1 is not found after step 4). After step 5), the AF received a K~AF~ which is different from the K~AF~ that received after step 2).
Expected Format of Evidence

Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., Screenshot containing the operational results.
PDFs 9988fdc53faf85d6b913bc195f229a7c

4.2.3.2.4.1 Confidentiality

 Home → AKMA_AAnF → 19.0.0
33537-i00   33537-i01   → 33537-i10   → 33537-i20    33537-j00
Test Name TC_PROTECT_SBA_AAnF_AUSF
Threat Reference

TR 33.926 [3], Annex W.2.2.1, Control plane data protection with AUSF
Requirement Name

Confidentiality, integrity and replay protections over SBA interface
Requirement Reference

TS 33.535 [4], clause 4.4.0
Requirement Description

The SBA interface between the AAnF and the AUSF is confidentiality, integrity and replay protected as specified in TS 33.535 [4], clause 4.4.0
Test Purpose

Verify that the transported data between AAnF and AUSF are confidentiality, integrity and replay protected over SBA interface.
Pre-Conditions

  • AAnF and AUSF network products are connected in simulated/real network environment.

  • Network product documentation containing information about supported TLS protocol and certificates is provided by the vendor.

  • Tester shall have access to the SBA interface between AAnF and AUSF.
Execution Steps

The requirement mentioned in this clause is tested in accordance with the procedure mentioned in clause 4.2.2.2.2 of TS 33.117 [2].
Expected Results

The user data transported between AAnF and AUSF is confidentiality, integrity and replay protected.
Expected Format of Evidence

Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., evidence can be presented in the form of screenshot/screen-capture or pcap traces.
PDFs e6149d196f1681319b34a9b9b4ed7b2b

4.2.3.2.4.1 Confidentiality

 Home → AKMA_AAnF → 18.2.0
33537-i00   33537-i01   → 33537-i10   →  33537-i20 33537-j00  
Test Name TC_PROTECT_SBA_AAnF_AUSF
Threat Reference

TR 33.926 [3], Annex W.2.2.1, Control plane data protection with AUSF
Requirement Name

Confidentiality, integrity and replay protections over SBA interface
Requirement Reference

TS 33.535 [4], clause 4.4.0
Requirement Description

The SBA interface between the AAnF and the AUSF is confidentiality, integrity and replay protected as specified in TS 33.535 [4], clause 4.4.0
Test Purpose

Verify that the transported data between AAnF and AUSF are confidentiality, integrity and replay protected over SBA interface.
Pre-Conditions

  • AAnF and AUSF network products are connected in simulated/real network environment.

  • Network product documentation containing information about supported TLS protocol and certificates is provided by the vendor.

  • Tester shall have access to the SBA interface between AAnF and AUSF.
Execution Steps

The requirement mentioned in this clause is tested in accordance with the procedure mentioned in clause 4.2.2.2.2 of TS 33.117 [2].
Expected Results

The user data transported between AAnF and AUSF is confidentiality, integrity and replay protected.
Expected Format of Evidence

Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., evidence can be presented in the form of screenshot/screen-capture or pcap traces.
PDFs e6149d196f1681319b34a9b9b4ed7b2b

4.2.3.2.4.2 Confidentiality

 Home → AKMA_AAnF → 19.0.0
33537-i00   33537-i01   → 33537-i10   → 33537-i20    33537-j00
Test Name TC_PROTECT_AAnF_AF_NEF
Threat Reference

TR 33.926 [3], Annex W.2.2.2, Control plane data protection with AF/NEF
Requirement Name

Confidentiality, integrity and replay protections over SBA interface
Requirement Reference

TS 33.535 [4], clause 4.4.0
Requirement Description

The SBA interface between AAnF and AF/NEF is confidentiality, integrity and replay protected as specified in TS 33.535 [4], clause 4.4.0
Test Purpose

Verify that the transported data between AAnF and AF/NEF are confidentiality, integrity and replay protected over SBA interface.
Pre-Conditions

  • AAnF and AF/NEF network products are connected in simulated/real network environment.

  • Network product documentation containing information about supported TLS protocol and certificates is provided by the vendor.

  • Tester shall have access to the SBA interface between AAnF and AF/NEF.
Execution Steps

The requirement mentioned in this clause is tested in accordance with the procedure mentioned in clause 4.2.2.2.2 of TS 33.117 [2].
Expected Results

The user data transported between AAnF and AF/NEF is confidentiality, integrity and replay protected.
Expected Format of Evidence

Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., evidence can be presented in the form of screenshot/screen-capture or pcap traces.
PDFs 88f596e03bc096259e700e4fb3bacc30

4.2.3.2.4.2 Confidentiality

 Home → AKMA_AAnF → 18.2.0
33537-i00   33537-i01   → 33537-i10   →  33537-i20 33537-j00  
Test Name TC_PROTECT_AAnF_AF_NEF
Threat Reference

TR 33.926 [3], Annex W.2.2.2, Control plane data protection with AF/NEF
Requirement Name

Confidentiality, integrity and replay protections over SBA interface
Requirement Reference

TS 33.535 [4], clause 4.4.0
Requirement Description

The SBA interface between AAnF and AF/NEF is confidentiality, integrity and replay protected as specified in TS 33.535 [4], clause 4.4.0
Test Purpose

Verify that the transported data between AAnF and AF/NEF are confidentiality, integrity and replay protected over SBA interface.
Pre-Conditions

  • AAnF and AF/NEF network products are connected in simulated/real network environment.

  • Network product documentation containing information about supported TLS protocol and certificates is provided by the vendor.

  • Tester shall have access to the SBA interface between AAnF and AF/NEF.
Execution Steps

The requirement mentioned in this clause is tested in accordance with the procedure mentioned in clause 4.2.2.2.2 of TS 33.117 [2].
Expected Results

The user data transported between AAnF and AF/NEF is confidentiality, integrity and replay protected.
Expected Format of Evidence

Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., evidence can be presented in the form of screenshot/screen-capture or pcap traces.
PDFs 88f596e03bc096259e700e4fb3bacc30