4.2.2.1.1 Priority of UP security policy |
Home → SMF → 19.0.0 |
| 33515-h00 → 33515-i00 33515-i10  33515-j00 | |
| Test Name | TC_UP_POLICY_PRECEDENCE_SMF | |
| Threat Reference | TR 33.926 [4], clause J.2.2.1 Non-compliant UP security policy handling |
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| Requirement Name | Priority of UP security policy |
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| Requirement Reference | TS 23.501 [1], clause 5.10.3 |
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| Requirement Description | User Plane Security Policy from UDM takes precedence over locally configured User Plane Security Policy as specified in TS 23.501 [1], clause 5.10.3 |
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| Test Purpose | Verify that the user plane security policy from the UDM takes precedence at the SMF under test over locally configured user plane security policy. |
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| Pre-Conditions | Test environment with AMF and UDM may be simulated. Both UDM and SMF under test are configured with UP security policy, and the UP security policies are different. There is no Session Management Subscription data in SMF. |
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| Execution Steps |
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| Expected Results | There is a Security Indication IE in the N2 SM information contained in the Namf_Communication_N1N2MessageTransfer message, which is the same with the UP security policy configured in the UDM. |
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| Expected Format of Evidence | Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., Screenshot containing the operational results. |
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| PDFs | 1ed23fa4f9cfaafd750db5630b79c181 | |
4.2.2.1.1 Priority of UP security policy |
Home → SMF → 17.0.0 |
|  33515-h00 → 33515-i00 33515-i10 33515-j00 | |
| Test Name | TC_UP_POLICY_PRECEDENCE_SMF | |
| Threat Reference | TR 33.926 [4], clause J.2.2.1 Non-compliant UP security policy handling |
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| Requirement Name | Priority of UP security policy |
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| Requirement Reference | TS 23.501 [1], clause 5.10.3 |
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| Requirement Description | "User Plane Security Policy from UDM takes precedence over locally configured User Plane Security Policy." as specified in TS 23.501 [1], clause 5.10.3 |
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| Test Purpose | Verify that the user plane security policy from the UDM takes precedence at the SMF under test over locally configured user plane security policy. |
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| Pre-Conditions | Test environment with AMF and UDM may be simulated. Both UDM and SMF under test are configured with UP security policy, and the UP security policies are different. There is no Session Management Subscription data in SMF. |
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| Execution Steps |
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| Expected Results | There is a Security Indication IE in the N2 SM information contained in the Namf_Communication_N1N2MessageTransfer message, which is the same with the UP security policy configured in the UDM. |
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| Expected Format of Evidence | Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., Screenshot containing the operational results. |
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| PDFs | 70182ff548a74cfb7b7e63cffb3e134a | |
4.2.2.1.3 Security functional requirements on the SMF checking UP security policy |
Home → SMF → 19.0.0 |
| 33515-h00 → 33515-i00 → 33515-i10 →  33515-j00 | |
| Test Name | TC_UP_SECURITY_POLICY_SMF | |
| Threat Reference | TR 33.926 [4], clause J.2.2.4, Unchecked UP security policy. |
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| Requirement Name | UP security policy check. |
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| Requirement Reference | TS 33.501 [8], clause 6.6.1 |
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| Requirement Description | According to TS 33.501 [8], clause 6.6.1, the SMF verifies that the UE's UP security policy received from the target ng-eNB/gNB is the same as the UE's UP security policy that the SMF has locally stored. If there is a mismatch, the SMF sends its locally stored UE's UP security policy of the corresponding PDU sessions to the target gNB. This UP security policy information, if included by the SMF, is delivered to the target ng-eNB/gNB in the Path-Switch Acknowledge message. The SMF logs capabilities for this event and may take additional measures, such as raising an alarm. |
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| Test Purpose | Verify that the SMF checks the UP security policy that is sent by the ng-eNB/gNB during handover. |
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| Pre-Conditions | The SMF under test is preconfigured with a UE UP security policy. |
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| Execution Steps |
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| Expected Results | The preconfigured UE security policy is contained in the 'n2SmInfo' IE in the captured Response message. |
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| Expected Format of Evidence | Files containing the triggered HTTP messages (e.g. pcap trace). |
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| PDFs | 5d47280f345fd4abf53a1b924f511115 | |
4.2.2.1.3 Security functional requirements on the SMF checking UP security policy |
Home → SMF → 17.0.0 |
|  33515-h00 → 33515-i00 → 33515-i10 → 33515-j00 | |
| Test Name | TC_UP_SECURITY_POLICY _SMF |
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| Threat Reference | TR 33.926 [4], clause J.2.2.4, Unchecked UP security policy. |
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| Requirement Name | UP security policy check. |
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| Requirement Reference | TS 33.501 [8], clause 6.6.1 |
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| Requirement Description | "The SMF shall verify that the UE's UP security policy received from the target ng-eNB/gNB is the same as the UE's UP security policy that the SMF has locally stored. If there is a mismatch, the SMF shall send its locally stored UE's UP security policy of the corresponding PDU sessions to the target gNB. This UP security policy information, if included by the SMF, is delivered to the target ng-eNB/gNB in the Path-Switch Acknowledge message. The SMF shall log capabilities for this event and may take additional measures, such as raising an alarm. " |
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| Test Purpose | Verify that the SMF checks the UP security policy that is sent by the ng-eNB/gNB during handover. |
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| Pre-Conditions | The SMF under test is preconfigured with a UE UP security policy. |
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| Execution Steps |
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| Expected Results | The preconfigured UE security policy is contained in the 'n2SmInf' IE in the captured Response message. |
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| Expected Format of Evidence | Files containing the triggered GTP messages (e.g. pcap trace). |
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| PDFs | c6ca81a7340edce2d0f1a3857db8c98c | |
4.2.2.1.4 Charging ID Uniqueness |
Home → SMF → 19.0.0 |
| 33515-h00 → 33515-i00 33515-i10 →  33515-j00 | |
| Test Name | TC_CHARGING_ID_UNIQUENESS_SMF | |
| Threat Reference | TR 33.926 [4], clause J.2.2.3, "Failure to assign unique Charging ID for a session" |
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| Requirement Name | Charging ID uniqueness. |
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| Requirement Reference | TS 32.255 [6], clause 5.1.2 |
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| Requirement Description | According to TS 32.255 [6], clause 5.1.2:
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| Test Purpose | Verify that the charging ID generated by the SMF for each PDU session is unique. |
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| Pre-Conditions | Test environment is set up with a Charging Function (CHF), which may be real or simulated, and the SMF under test. The tester is able to capture the traffic between the SMF under test and the CHF. |
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| Execution Steps |
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| Expected Results | The charging ID in each Charging Data Request [initial] is unique. |
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| Expected Format of Evidence | Files containing the Charging Data Request [initial] messages (e.g. pcap trace). |
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| PDFs | 9a4387d54fd9e98b2e0931754260ab16 | |
4.2.2.1.4 Charging ID Uniqueness |
Home → SMF → 17.0.0 |
|  33515-h00 → 33515-i00 33515-i10 → 33515-j00 | |
| Test Name | TC_CHARGING_ID_UNIQUENESS_SMF | |
| Threat Reference | TR 33.926 [4], clause J.2.2.3, "Failure to assign unique Charging ID for a session" |
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| Requirement Name | Charing ID uniqueness. |
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| Requirement Reference | TS 32.255 [6], clause 5.1.2 |
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| Requirement Description | : "- The SMF shall support PDU session charging using service based interface.
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| Test Purpose | Verify that the charging ID generated by the SMF for each PDU session is unique. |
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| Pre-Conditions | Test environment is set up with a Charging Function (CHF), which may be real or simulated, and the SMF under test. The tester is able to capture the traffic between the SMF under test and the CHF. |
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| Execution Steps |
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| Expected Results | The charging ID in each Charging Data Request [initial] is unique. |
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| Expected Format of Evidence | Files containing the Charging Data Request [initial] messages (e.g. pcap trace). |
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| PDFs | abcaed6c157ba06b8fd87aaeada124fd | |